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THE GENDER EARNINGS GAP: SOME
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
This paper uses micro-data to analyze international differences in the gender pay gap among
a sample of ten industrializednations. We particularlyfocus on explaining the surprisingly low
ranking of the U.S. in comparison to other industrialized countries. Empirical research on gender
pay gaps has traditionally focused on the role of gender-specific factors, particularly gender
differences in qualifications and differences in the treatment of otherwise equally qualified male
and female workers (i.e., labor market discrimination). An innovative feature of our study is to
focus on the role of wage structure--the array of prices set for various labor market skills--in
influencing the gender gap.
The striking finding of this study is the enormous importance of overall wage structure in
explaining the lower ranking of U.S. women. Our results suggest that the U.S. gap would be
similar to that in countries like Sweden, Italy and Australia (the countries with the smallest gaps)
if the U.S. had their level of wage inequality. This insight helps to resolve three puzzling sets
of facts: (1) U.S. women compare favorably with women in other countries in terms of human
capital and occupational status: (2) the U.S. has had a longer and often stronger commitment to
equal pay and equal employment opportunity policies than have most of the other countries in
our sample; but (3) the gender pay gap is larger in the U.S. than in most industrialized countries.
An important part of the explanation of this pattern is that the labor market in the U.S. places
a much larger penalty on those with lower levels of labor market skills (both measured and
unmeasured).
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and NBERDespite in many cases dramatic reductions in the male-female pay gap since the 1950s,
genderdifferentials persist inall industrialized nations. However, the size of the gender gap
varies considerablyacrosscountries. Publisheddata suggestthat,by the late 1980s, the
Scandinavian countries, France, Australiaand NewZealand hadfemale-to-male hourly pay
ratios of 80-90 percent, while other countries in Western Europe and the U.S. had pay ratios
of roughly 65-75 percent. The U.S. was among the countries with the largest differentials.
Only Japan with a ratio as low as 50percenthad a consistently larger gap (see Figure 1). This
paper uses micrc-data to analyze international differencesin the gender pay gap among a
sample of ten industrialized nations. We particularly focus on explaining the surprisingly low
ranking of the U.S. in comparison to other industrialized countries. An advantage of an
international perspective is that countries vary considerably with respect to governmental
policies, women's relative labor market qualifications and wage-setting institutions. Such
variability allows one to infer reasons for differences in the pay gap and, by implication, the
impact of alternative government policies.
Empirical research on gender pay gaps has traditionally focused on the role of gender
differences in qualifications and of differences in the treatment of otherwise equally qualified
male and female workers (i.e., labor market discrimination). Analyses of trends over time in
the gender differential within countries as well as intercountry comparisons of gender earnings
ratios have tended to emphasize these types of gender-specific factors. An innovative feature
of our study is to focus on the role of wage structure as an additional factor influencing the
gender gap. To analyze the impact of wage structure, we adapt a framework developed by
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) to analyze trends over time in race differentialsin the U.S.
Our findings suggest that labor market institutions that affect overall wage inequality have an
extremely important effect on the gender earnings gap.
Wage structure describes the array of prices set for various labor marketskills
(measured and unmeasured) and rents received for employment in particular sectorsof the
economy. Research on gender-specific factors influencing the pay gap suggeststhat men and2
women tend to havedifferentlevels of labor market skills and to be employed in different
sectors. This implies a potentially important role for wage structure in determining the pay
gap. For example, suppose that in two countries, women have lower levels of labor market
experience than men but that the gender difference in experience is the same in the two
countries. If the return to experience is higher in one country, then that nation will have a
larger gender pay gap. Or, as another example, suppose that the extent of occupational
segregation by sex is the same in two countries but that the wage premium associated with
employment in male jobs is higher in one country. Then, again, that country will have a
higher pay gap.
Skill prices can be affected by relative supplies, by technology (e.g. high tech
industries place a premium on highly trained workers), by the composition of demand, or, as
emphasized in this paper, by the wage-setting institutions of each country. Specifically,
centralized wage-setting institutions which tend to reduce interfirm and interindustry wage
variation and are often associated with conscious policies to raise the relative pay of low-wage
workers (regardless of gender) may indirectly reduce the gender pay gap.
The striking finding of this study is the enormous importance of overall wage structure
in explaining the international differences, particularly the lower ranking of U.S. women. The
higher level of wage inequality in the U.S. than elsewhere works to increase the gender
differential in the U.S. relative to all the other countries in our sample. Our results suggest
that the U.S. gap would be similar to that in countries like Sweden, Italy and Australia (the
countries with the smallest gaps) if the U.S. had their level of wage inequality.
This insight helps to resolve three puzzling sets of facts: (1) U.S. women compare
favorably with women in other countries in terms of human capital and occupational status; (2)
the U.S. has had a longer and often stronger commitment to equalpay and equal employment
opportunity policies than have most of the other countries in our sample; but (3) the gender
pay gap is larger in the U.S. than in most industrialized countries. An important part of the
explanation of this pattern is that the labor market in the U.S. places a much larger penalty on3
those with tower levels of labor market skills (both measured and unmeasured). Put
differently, our findingssuggestthat the gender gap in pay in the U.S.would befar less than
it isifU.S. wage-setting processes more closely resembled those in the other countries, as
longasU.S. women retained the same levelofrelative skills.1
In additionto having arelativelyhighlevelofwage inequality, the U.S. labor market
has seen a major increase ininequalityand the rewardstoskillsover the 1970s and1980s
(Katz andMurphy,1992; Juhn, Murphy andPierce,forthcoming). Thus, while American
womenhaveincreased their relativelevelsoflabor marketskills (Blau andFerber,1992;
O'Neill andPolachek, 1991), theyareessentially swimming upstream in a labor market that
has grown increasingly unfavorable to those with below-average skills. The decline in the
U.S. gender pay gap in the 1980s becomes all the more impressive in light of this growing
overall inequality. Below, we present U.S. data indicating that over the 1971-88 period, rising
U.S. wage inequality reduced the convergence in the gender pay gap by about one fourth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a brief overview of our findings.
highlighting the striking importance of wage structure in explaining the international
differences. Section II summarizes the institutional setting in each country focusing on gender-
specific policies and the degree of centralization of wage-setting institutions. Section III
outlines the basic analytical framework and presents detailed empirical results based on our
microdata files. Section IV examines the impact of rising inequality on the U.S. gender pay
gap over the 1971-88 period. Finally, Section V presents our conclusions.
I. An Overview of the Findings
International differences in gender gaps are summarized in Figure 2 which gives gender
earnings ratios adjusted for hours for ten industrialized countries based on our micro-data files
for each country. Data are from the mid-1980s, with the exception of Norway and Sweden for
Of course, under different wage-setting institutions, U.S. women might have different
incentives to acquire labor market skills.4
which the data are from around 1980.2 (More detailed information about the data and the
adjustment processaregiven below.) Figure 2 indicates that Italy, Sweden, Austria and
Australia have the highest gender ratios. The U.S.rankstowards the bottom of the group,
with six of the nine countries (Sweden, Norway, Australia, Austria, Italy, and Germany)
having higher gender earnings ratios, and only three (the U.K., Hungary and Switzerland)
having lower ratios.
The Italian ratio probably overstates the actual gender ratio in that country. Italy has
an especially large proportion of workers who are self-employed or work in an informal sector
in which government-mandated benefits are not paid. The self-employed could not be
included in computing the gender ratio for Italy because hours worked were not available for
them. However, we did ascertain that the gender ratio (not adjusted for hours) in Italy is
considerably smaller (.6566) when the self-employed are included than when the sample is
restricted to employees (.743l). Further, it is likely that informal sector employment is
underreported by the respondents in our survey-based data, possibly also resulting in an
understatement of the gender gap. Nonetheless, it is likely that Italy is among the countries
with the smallest gender gaps, although not necessarily heading the list, as would be suggested
by the data in Figure 2.
To illuminate the role of wage structure, we present the mean percentile rankings of
women in the male wage distribution for each country in Figure 3•4 Gender-specific factors,
including differences in qualifications and the impact of labor market discrimination, are
2 Thecountry rankings here are similar to those based on published data (when available) or
other studies. Note, however, the ratios for the Scandinavian countries and Australia are
below those reported in OECD publications. This discrepancyappears to be due to the OECD
data being restricted to manufacturing workers for Sweden and Norway and to nonsupervisory
employees for Australia. The magnitudes of the gender ratios which we obtain are consistent
with other studies which use microdata for these countries.
The gender ratios for the other countries were similar regardless of whether or not the self-
employed were included. Our results include the self-employed for the other countries.
4That is, we assign each woman incountry j a percentile ranking in country j's male wage
distribution. The female mean of these percentiles bycountry is presented in Figure 2.S
viewed asdetermining the percentileranking ofwomen in the malewagedistribution, while
theoverall wage structure (as measured by the magnitude of male wage inequality) determines
thewage penalty or reward associated with this position in the wage distribution. The basic
premise is that males at the same percentile ranking as women may be viewed as comparable
in the eyes of employers. Thus the same set of factors will determine the relative rewards of
women and of these comparable males, and differences between the rankings of countries in
Figures 2 and 3 represent the role of wage structure.
The most striking difference is for the U.S. Whereas the U.S. ranks towards the
bottom of the list withrespectto the female-male earnings ratios, it ranks near the top in terms
of women's percentile ranking. Only Italy ranks higher and, as noted above, we have most
likely overstated Italy's gender ratio. Thus, the relatively high gender pay gap in the U.S.
does not appear to be due to a low ranking of women in the male wage distribution, rather it is
due to the higher level of wage inequality in the U.S. which results in an especially large wage
penalty forbeingbelow average in the distribution.
Also notable incomparingthe two figures isthechange in therankings ofthe
Scandinavian countries. Sweden falls from the 2nd highest country in Figure 2 to the 5th in
Figure 3, while Norway falls from 5th in Figure 2 to 8th in Figure 3. This suggests that the
relatively more equal wage distribution in the Scandinavian countries is an important reason
for the relatively high status of women there. So, for example, while the mean percentile
ranking of women in the U.S. is 33.2, at the U.S. level of male wage inequality this
corresponds to a wage which is 66.9 percent of the male mean. In contrast, Swedish women's
percentile ranking of 28.2 corresponds to a wage which is 77.2 percent of the male mean and
Norwegian women's ranking of 26.4 corresponds to 71.4 percent of the male mean.
II. The Institutional Setting
In this section we review international differences in gender-specific policies and basic
wage-setting institutions. Human capital is also a major determinant of gender pay gaps, and6
below, we present some international comparisons of women's relative levels of measured
human capital. However, international differences in policies and institutions appear to be
more dramatic than those in women's relative human capital levels, at least in our sample.
Further, human capital can be affected by such policies and institutions as discussed below.
We therefore emphasize the institutional setting in our comparisons of gender-based wage
differentials. We first consider what the effect of the policies and wage-setting institutions is
expected to be; then we compare each country to the U.S. across each dimension. We also
note findings from previous research whichsuggest the importanceof both gender-specific
policies and labor market institutions in reducing the gender pay gap in specific instances.
Gender-specific policies include equal employment opportunity (EEC) and anti-
discrimination laws, as well as laws and policies governing family leave. The expected
positive effect of the former on the earnings ratio is reasonably straightforward, although the
impact will most likely depend on the effectiveness of the legislation as well as its provisions.
Moreover, evaluating the impact of EEOlawchanges on women's relative pay in specific
instances is complicated by the difficulty of locating an appropriate control group and, as
Ehrenberg (1989) has pointed out, the possibility that the change in law was endogenously
determined.
In general, it is expected that, given considerable segregation of women by occupation
and industry, equal pay laws mandating equal pay for equal work within the same occupation
and firm will have a relatively small effect. Laws requiring equal opportunity, hiring
preferences, and/or "comparable worth" (i.e., equal pay for work of equal value to the firm,
regardless of specific occupational category) have potentially larger impacts on the wage
differential. In addition, since EEC laws involve occupational shifts, they may require
considerable time to have an impact on pay. Thus, the comparable worth approach which
provides for immediate increases in relative pay in female-dominated occupations may be
expected to have the largest initial wage effect, possibly accompanied by a negative impact on
female employment.7
The expected impact of family leave (disproportionately taken by women even when it
is available to men) is unclear a priori.Onthe one hand, it is possible that such policies raise
the relative earnings of women by encouraging the preservation of their ties to particular firms
and hence increasing the incentives of employers and women to invest in firm-specific
training. On the other hand, the existence of such policies could increase the incidence and/or
durationoftemporary labor force withdrawals among women, raising the gender gap for the
affected group.Further,the incremental costs associated with mandated leave policies may
increase theincentivesofemployersto discriminate against women.
With respect to wage structure, it seems likely that systems of centrally-determined pay
entail smaller gender wage differentials for a variety of reasons. First, in the U.S., a
significant portion of the male-female pay gap is associated with interindustry or interfirm
wage differentials that result from its relatively decentralized-pay setting institutions (Blau,
1977; Johnson and Solon, 1986; Sorensen, 1990; and Groshen, 1991). Thus, centralized
systems which reduce the extent of wage variation across industries and firms are likely to
lower the gender differential, all else equal. Second, since in all countries the female wage
distribution lies below the male distribution, centralized systems that consciously raise
minimum pay levels regardless of gender will also tend to lower male-female wage
differentials. Finally, the impact of gender-specific policies to raise female wages may be
greater under centralized systems where such policies can be more speedily and effectively
implemented.
We now turn to a comparison of the U.S. to the other countries in our sample along
each of these three dimensions. First, with respect to gender-specific discrimination policies,
equal employment policy in the U.S.S has consisted of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (requiring
equal pay for equal work), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (requiring equal employment
opportunity), and the Executive Order implemented in 1968 (which requires government
See Blau and Ferber (1992) for a summary.8
contractors to take"affirmativeaction" to see thatwomen andminorities are equitably
treated). Comparable worthpaypolicies remain rare in the private sector although they have
beenadopted by a number of stategovernments.
Ingeneral,U.S.policies in this area compare relativelyfavorably on their face to those
of the other countriesin our sample. All have passed some equal pay and equal opportunity
legislation, but, interestingly, the U.S. commitment, particularly to equal employment
opportunity,predatesthatin most of the other countries(SeeTable 1). While Italy did
mandateEqualPay through collective bargaining in the industrial sectorin1960 (predating the
U.S.Equal Pay Act by threeyears), an Equal Employment Opportunity Act was not passed
thereuntil 1977. The earliest ofthe other countries, Australia and the U.K.,began to
implementequal pay in 1969 and1970.Equal Opportunity measureswereinstituted in 1975
in the U.K. and 1978 in Norway. The remainder of the countries passed all relevant
legislation in the 1980s. The one country with a clearly stronger intervention than the U.S. is
Australia, the only one to have implemented a nationalpolicyof comparable worththrough its
laborcourts (see below). (Although Switzerland incorporated the principle of equal pay for
work of equal value into its constitution in 1981 (Simona 1985), there is no indication that it
has beenimplementedas yet).
There is some econometric evidence that,all else equal,government policy in the
1970s raised the U.S. female-male pay ratio (BelIer, 1979); and further that the portion of the
differentialattributable to discrimination (as conventionally measured) declined (Blau and
BelIer, 1988). Strongerevidence of the impact of anti-discrimination policies has been
obtained for Australia, Sweden and the U.K. Since the impact of these policies was related to
labor market structure, we discuss it below.
The laws governing maternity and parental leave in the various countries are
summarized in Table 2. The U.S. is the only country in our sample which does not have
government-mandat leave atthefederallevel.It is, however, required in the U.S.that
pregnancy be treated the same as any other medical disability. Thus, leave for the physical9
aspects of child-bearing must be covered under a firm's medical disability plan, if it hasone.
Further, it hasbeen foundthat 40 percent of employees of large and medium size
establishments are employed at firms which provide parental leave to women beyond this, the
vast majority (92 percent) at firms offering unpaid leave (Hyland, 1990). Plans allowed an
average of 20 weeks off for unpaid leave. It may be noted that provision for parental leave is
particularly generous in Sweden where nearly a year of paid parental leave is provided after 12
weeks of paid (at 90 percent) maternity leave. While the U.S. clearly lags behind the other
countries in the provision of parental leave, as our discussion above suggests, it is unclear
what impact this will have on the pay gap.
U.S. pay-setting is far less centralized than that in the other countries in this study,
with the possible exception of Switzerland. The U.S. unionization rates of 20.5 percent for
male and 12.5 percent for female workers are considerably lower than elsewhere (see Table A-
2). Further, the collective bargaining process itself is very decentralized in the U.S., with an
emphasis on single-firm agreements, and the U.S. government exerts minimal intervention in
wage-setting (Flanagan, Kahn, Smith and Ehrenberg, 1989). Wage determination is also
highly decentralized in Switzerland where there is no minimum wage legislation and many
collective bargaining agreements do not mention pay (Wrong 1987). While we have no
explicit information on Hungary, we assume that as a (then) Communist country, albeit a
somewhat more market-oriented one, it most likely had relatively centralized wage-
determination institutions.
Wage setting is clearly very centralized in the Scandinavian countries where the great
majority of workers (64-80 percent in our micro-data) are unionized and the collective
bargaining process is very centralized. For example, in Sweden and Norway, the major union
federation (LO) signs an agreement with the employers (SAF) covering a rnor portion of thel0
labor force.6 Several changes in collective bargaining practices, both gender-specific and
general, helpedreducethe Swedish gender pay gap (Lofstrom and Gustafsson 1991). From
1960-65,labor andmanagement phasedout the system of separate wage schedulesfor menand
women that hadpreviously existed in Swedish collective bargainingagreements.Inaddition,
from1968to1974,the LO made a conscious effort to raisetherelative wages of lower-paid
workers, regardless of gender. Finally, in 1977 the LO andSAFnegotiateda comprehensive
package ofequalemploymentprovisions, predating the 1980 passage of formal EEO
legislation.
German andAustrianwage determination institutions are also highly centralized,and
Austrian pay-setting in particular appearstoresemble that of Sweden and Norway. While a
smaller percentage of Austrian workers is unionized than in Scandinavia (Table A-2),
collective bargainingagreements inAustriain most casescoveran entire industryorgroup of
industries throughout the country. There thus appears to be little room for interfirm
differentialsin negotiated wages among union workers.Further,theterms of suchagreements
extend tononunionworkers(Tomandland Fuerboeck,1986).
While collectivebargaining in Germanyis lesscentralized than in Austria,itis
undoubtedly more centralizedthanin the U.S. Unlike the U.S.emphasis on single-firm
agreements, contractsusuallycover all employers in an industry in a state (Kennedy1982).
As in Austria, the terms ofsuchagreements extend to nonunion workers. In contrast to
Austria, however, nationwide agreements and interindustry contractsarerare.
The Australian wage setting processwhilealsohighlycentralizeddiffersconsiderably
fromthecountriesdescribed above. In Australia minimum wage rates for occupationsareset
bygovernment tribunals.7 Currently,nearly90 percent of employees are covered by tribunal
6 Whilewage setting is still far more centralizedinthesecountries thanin otherEuropean
nations,thereweresome signsthat the system wasbecomingless centralizedin the1980s
(Leion, 1985; Thorsrud,1985).
This description ofAustralianpay-setting is basedon Gregory and Daly(1991) and
Kilhngsworth(1990).11
awards.Until WorldWar H, female award rates were set at 54 percent of male rates; in 1950,
this was raised to 75 percent. From 1969to1972,theconcept of equalpayforequalwork
was implemented, as the female award rate was raised to 100 percent of the male rate for the
same job. Finally, in 1972, the Federal Tribunal moved to the comparable worth concept so
that women in female occupations would also be covered by rulings on the minimum male
award in other occti The raw data in Figure 1, as well as some econometric evidence
(e.g., Gregory and Daly, 1991) suggest that these gender-specific policies implemented by the
wage courts have played an important role in lowering the pay gap.
Wage determination in Italy is also a very centralized process, and has included explicit
attempts to narrow pay differentials in a manner similar to that in Scandinavia. First, while
about 40 percent of the Italian labor force in 1985 was unionized (Bean and Holden, 1992),
labor courts in Italy are empowered to extend the terms of collective bargaining agreements to
nonunion workers (Treu, 1990), most likely yielding an effective degree of unionization which
is considerably greater. Second, and more important for understanding the Italian wage
structure, is the operation of the wage indexation system, known as the scalamobile. This
system, in existence since 1975, gives across-the-board lira increases in wages in response to
inflation in a conscious attempt to reduced skilled-nonskilled pay differentials (Treu, 1990).
By 1990, Italian employers claimed that accumulated indexation payments accounted for 40
percent of labor costs.9
Wage-setting in Britain appears to be less centralized than in the countries reviewed
above, but is most likely more centralized than in the U.S. Roughly 40-50 percent of British
workers are in unions, suggesting a larger role for unions and the collective bargaining process
in Britain. In other respects, the wage-setting process appears similar to the U.S. In the
British private sector in 1980, only 26 percent of all (union and nonunion) workers had their
While about 40 percent of workers are covered by federal (compared to state or other)
awards, these other tribunals often follow the federal lead (Killingsworth 1990).
See "New Industrial Relations Talks Continue," (January 1990), p. 7.12
wages set in multiemployercontractsorby wages councils. The restwerecoveredbysingle-
firm agreements or had wages determined by management (Sisson and Brown, 1983).
Similarly government intervention in British pay-setting has been largely limited to periods in
which incomes policies limited overall wage increases and reliance on such policies waned in
the l9SOs (Davies, 1983).
In an econometric analysis that controlled for other factors affecting women's relative
pay, Zabalza and Tzannatos (1985) found significant effects for the 1970 equal pay legislation.
This legislation was implemented through collective agreements (it was not until 1975 that the
labor market was more broadly covered). Not only was it required that differentiated male
and female rates be removed, but also that in workplaces covered by collective agreements
women could not be paid at less than the lowest male rate (OECD 1988; Zabalza and
Tzannatos 1985). Thus, the impact of the law was in part to raise the minimum for women
covered by collective bargaining.
III. Earnjns Ratios in the Micro-Data
Our principal data source for the study of individual countries is the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP) data. The following countries and time periods were used: Austria
(1985-87), West Germany (1985-88), Hungary (1986-88), Switzerland (1987), United
Kingdom (1985-88), and United States (1985-88). The 1985-88 ISSP files lack data on the
Scandinavian countries, and preliminary results suggested that the Australian data in the ISSP
were inconsistent with other sources and that the Italian ISSP data contained very few
observations on women. We therefore supplemented the ISSP with three additional micro-data
sets in order to include these countries with very high gender earnings ratios. We used the
Clasp Structure and Class Consciousness (CSCC) data base, originally compiled by Erik
Wright, for Sweden (1980) and Norway (1982); the Income Distribution Survey (IDS) for13
Australia (1986); and a Bank of Italy (BI) survey for Italy (1987).In each case, the sample
was restricted to individuals aged 18-65 years old.
The specific earnings measures used in the data for each country are described in detail
in the Appendix.In eachcase the earnings figure is expressed on an annual or monthly basis.
Thecomputation of gender wage differentialsfrom these datasets is complicatedbythe
omission from thesefilesof information on annualweeks worked. Weekly hoursworked is
available,however, allowing for someadjustment of the earningsdatafortimeinput)1 (The
adjustment for time input isdescribed below.)Inall but two cases, theearnings variable was
coded intocategories)2Intheanalyses presented below,we arbitrarilycoded thetop (open-
ended)categoryas1.2timesits minimumvalue. However, the gender ratioswerevirtually
identical when we experimented withalternativeassumptions for the top categoryrangingfrom
1to1.5 times itsminimum value.Finally, concernfor adequatesample sizeled usto pool
years of data for those countries in the ISSPsurveyedmore than once (see above).
For descriptions of thesedata,see Blanchflowerand Freeman(1992)--ISSP;Rosenfeld and
Kalleberg(1990)--CSCC; Blackburn andBloom(199l)--IDS;and Erickson and Ichino
(1992)--BI.
There is information on weeks worked for Australia and for a subset of the Norwegian data.
Analyses correcting for weeks worked yielded very similar results to those reported here, with
slightly lower adjusted gender differentials. Lack of information on hours worked for those
with multiple jobs forced us to limit the Swedish sample to those with one job only.
12TheAustralian earnings data were originally reported as a continuous variable. However,
to maintain comparability with the other countries, we recoded the Australian earnings into the
ISSP's intervals for Australia. When the analysis was performed for Australia using the
original continuous variable, the results were virtually identical to those reported here. The El
data were also continuous but did not match up with the ISSP categories for Italy. We
therefore used the continuous earnings variable for Italy. As noted below, Italy s wage
distribution had lower residual variance than in most of the other countries. Use of earnings
categories for these other countries implies that Italy's residual variance would have been even
lower relative to the others if earnings categories had been used for Italy as well.14
A.Estimation of theGenderDifferentials
Table3gives estimatedgenderratiosfor logearnings corrected forhours for all
workers and by marital status. These estimates were obtained as follows. For each country,
the following regression was run separately by sex:'3
(1) InEARN =b0+ b1PART + b2HRPART + b3HRFULL + B'X + e,
where ln(EARN) is the natural log of earnings; PART is a dummy variable for part-time
employment (less than 35 hours perweek);ERPART andHRPULL are interactionsof weekly
work hours with part- and full-time status; X is a vector of explanatory variables including
years of schooling, potential experience and its square, unionmembership,14 and industrial
and occupation dummy variables; and e is an error term. (See the Appendix for the variable
means and regression results.) The model allows for both a part-time shift term and different
slopes for hours for part-time and full-time workers. A detailed adjustment for part-time
employment is important in light of the prevalence of part-time work for women in many
countries (seebelow).
The PART, HRPART and HRFULL coefficients from (1) were used to adjust each
person's earnings for work hours by assuming a 40 hour work week. That is, For each worker
we have:
(2) YFULL1 =lnEARN-bjPART- b3(HRPULLj-40)
where the coefficients, bn, are obtained from estimating equation (1) for males and females
separately. Gross hours-corrected gender earnings ratios based on the mean of YFULL. for the
indicated groups were then calculated for each country and are shown in Table 3.
t3For countries with more than one year of data, the log earnings variable was obtained by
transforming each observation into its 1988 (or end year) equivalent on the basis of regressions
including only gender and year dummy variables. Thus, the dependent variable for each
observation on individual i in year t is lnEARN -EtbtYRit,where lnEARNt is the observed
log earnings for individual i in year t, YRt and are the dummy variable and estimated
coefficient for year t respectively, and the end year is the omitted year.
14 Union status was not available for Italy or Australia.15
In the first column are the hours-corrected genderearnings ratioforallworkers shown
in Figure 2. The last two columns of Table 3 provide gender ratios for married and for single
workers separately.15 It is well-known that the family division of labor can influence pay gaps
by affecting women's (and men's) investments in human capital, accumulation of seniority and
experience, and job search strategies.16 Except for Hungary, for which we have no data on
hours, the pay ratio is relatively high among single workers, ranging from .83 to
Further, the rankings of the pay gaps for single workers are not always consistent with the
overall rankings. In contrast, the pay gap is much larger for married workers and corresponds
more consistently to the rankings for the overall labor force. Nonetheless, since the ratios for
married workers are always lower than those for single workers, a question may be raised as to
whether the overall differences in ratios across countries are simply due to intercountry
differences in family composition. This appears not to be the case, however. In the second
column of Table 3, the earnings ratios for all workers are computed using the U.S. proportions
of married and single workers. The implied ratios are similar to those for all workers in the
first column of the Table. This similarity suggests that cross-country differences in the family
composition of the labor force do not account for the observed differences in relative pay gaps.
Rather, as concluded above, it is the intercountry differences in the ratios particularly among
married workers that drive the international differences.
Note that equation (1) which is used to obtain hours-corrected earnings for each individual
does not control for marital status. This specification was employed because of the
complications involved in considering marital status as a productivity indicator for men and
women (see our discussion below). We do however provide additional results for a subsample
of married workers, a strategy that in effect controls for marital status.
16Thedivision of labor in the home can also of course be affected by women's relative labor
market opportunities. Nonetheless, we would still expect the division of labor to have some
impact on relative pay.
Reasons for the low estimated pay gaps among single workers include the likelihood that
they are disproportionately young (the pay gap is lower for young workers--see Mincer and
Polachek, 1974), and that single males are less productive than married males (see Korenman
and Neumark, 1991).16
B. Gender Differences in Worker Characteristics
The data presented in Table 3 suggest that international differences in the gender pay
gap are not due to differences in marital status composition. Before providing aformal
decomposition of these pay gaps, we briefly examine intercountry differences in other worker
characteristics.Such data can reveal atleast qualitative differences in the relative labor market
skills of women across countries. Overall, we conclude that U.S. women compare favorably
with those in other countries when we consider their labor market qualifications relative to
those of men.
For all countries except Switzerland and Italy, education and potential experience are
similar for men and women (see Table A-2). In Switzerland, the female labor force is less
educated and younger than the male labor force, while in Italy, women are more highly
educated and younger than men. While unfortunately we lack data on actual labor market
experience, some indication of labor force commitment may be gained by an examination of
the labor force participation (LFP) rates by gender-marital status groups for each country
shown in Table 4. As may be see in the Table, the labor force participation rate of the U.S.
women is higher than that in any of the other countries except Sweden. The absolute ma]e-
female differential in participation rates in the U.S. is comparable to that in Hungary and
lower than that in any of the other countries apart from Sweden.
While the U.S. female population has higher labor force participation than most other
countries in the 19$Os, this does not necessarily imply that the average employed American
woman has more labor market experience. It is possible that in a country with a high female
participation rate recent entrants comprise a high proportion of the labor force, and thus that
women workers have less experience on average than in a country with a low female LFP rate.
On the other hand, it is possible that a country's high female LFP rate is due to a more
continuous labor force attachment among women (Blau and Ferber, 1992; Polachek, 1990).
Polachek (1990) in fact finds that in the 1970s, a growing female LFP rate in the U.S.
was associated with a rising gender gap in actual experience. This finding was due to the low17
experiencelevels of the large number of new entrants (or reentrants). However, by the 1980s,
rising U.S. female LFPratesin the U.S. were accompanied by rising female relative
experience levels. Lacking international data on actual experience, we tentatively conclude
thatU.S. women are at least as oriented toward market work as women in most other
countries.
This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of the incidence of part-time work
shown in Table 5.Asmaller percentage of employed women in the U.S. than in any other
country works part time (less than 35 hours per week), Further, since the incidence of part-
time work among men is considerably higher in the U.S. than in other countries, the gender
differential in part-time work is much smaller in the U.S. than elsewhere. We particularly
note the high incidence of part-time work among Scandinavian women. About 46 percent of
Swedish and 53 percent of Norwegian employed women work part-time, compared to only 24
percent of employed U.S. Finally, while the incidence of part-time work is only
slightly higher for Italian than for U.S. women, the Italian female labor force participation rate
is much lower than that in the U.S. (Table 4).
The commitment of U.S. women to market work is further underscored by examination
of the incidence of part-time work by marital status also shown in Tables. In all countries,
married women are more likely to work part-time than single women, and single men
generally have a higher incidence of part-time work than married men. However, U.S.
married women are far less likely to work part-time than those in any other country, while
U.S. married men are slightly more likely to work part-time than those elsewhere. In
addition, the gap in the incidence of part-time work between married and single women is only
about .10 in the U.S., while it ranges from .24 to .36 elsewhere.
The high incidence of PART for Scandinavian women may be due in part to the generous
family leave policies in these countries. In addition to policies guaranteeing paid parental
leave in both Sweden and Norway, Sweden has since 1979 allowed working parents of small
children the right to have a six hour day on demand (Haavio-Mannila and Kauppinen,
forthcoming).18
Tables 4 and 5aresuggestiveof a higherlevel of relative labor force commitment
among U.S. women, particularly married women, than among those in most other countries.
Table 6 indicates a lower level of occupational segregation (at the one—digit level of
aggregation) for U.S. women than for those in other countries (with the exception of
Switzerland))9 Industrial segregation, again measured at the one digit level, is similar in the
U.S. to that in the other countries in the sample. The high levels of occupational and
industrial segregation in Scandinavia are especially noteworthy and perhaps understandable in
tightofthe high incidence of part-time work there.
Acountry's levelof occupational segregation is likely to reflect both women's relative
training levels and laborforcecommitment and the impact of employer, governmental or
union policies (Reskin, et. aL, 1986; Btau and Ferber, 1992). To the extent that it reflects
training and commitment, we may again conclude that U.S. women's workforce credentials
relative to men's exceed those in other countries.
C. Analysis of International Differences in the Pay Gao: The Effects of Skills.
Treatment of Women and Overall Ineoualitv
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) have devised a method that allows us to decompose
the international differences in gender pay gaps into a portion due to gender-specific factors
and a portion due to differences in the overall level of wage inequality. Following their
notation, suppose that we have for male worker i and country jamale wage equation:
(3) =
XijBj+
where Yj is the log of wages; X is a vector of explanatory variables; B is a vector of
coefficients; Oj is a standardized residual (i.e. with mean zero and variance 1 for each
country); andis the country's residual standard deviation of wages (i.e. its level of male
residual wage inequality).
t9This conclusion regarding the U.S. position largely holds true when the segregation index is
calculated using published data from the ILO (Blau and Ferber, 1992, p. 309). Note that our
findings for Switzerland must be interpreted with caution given the small size of our sample.
A segregation index computed on the basis of ILO data does not indicate a lower level of
segregation for Switzerland than for the U.S.19
Thenthe male-female log wage gap for countryj is:
(4) Dj eYmy.YIyoXJBj+960j,
wherethe m and(subscriptsreferto maleand femaleavenges, respectively;and a8prefix
signifiesthe average male-female difference for the variable immediately following.Equation
(4) states that the country's pay gap can be decomposed into differences in measured
qualifications (ôX), and differences in the standardized residual(&8)multiplied by the money
value per unitdifferenceinthestandardized residual (c9.2° Note that the final term of (4)
corresponds to the "unexplained" differential in a standard decomposition of the gender
differential when the contribution of the means is evaluated using the male function.
The pay gap difference between two countries j and k can then be decomposed
using (4):
(5) Dj-Dk = (&Xj-ôXlJBk+ ÔXJ(Bj-Bk) + (6Oj-3Ok)q
+60j(oj-ovj.
The first term in (5) reflects the contribution of intercountry differences in observed
labor market qualifications (31) to the gender gap. For example, thepay gap in one country
may be less than in another due to women's higher relative levels of education. The second
term reflects the impact of different measured prices across countries for observed labor
market qualifications. For example, for a given (positive) male-female difference in
schooling, a higher return to education will raise the male-female pay gap.
The third term measures the effect of international differences in the relative wage
positions of men and women after controlling for measured characteristics (i.e., whether
women rank higher or lower within the male residual wage distribution). That is, it gives the
20 Note that this formulation isbased on a single wage equation for males. That is, one could
repeat the analysis starting with a female wage equation. Male-female differences in
regression coefficients can reflect either discrimination or sex-correlated measurement errors of
variables such as experience. In using the male wage equation for this decomposition analysis,
we in effect simulate what the wage equation in a nondiscriminatory labor market would look
like (although the elimination of discrimination might change the male as well as the female
reward structure). We present both male and female wage equations for each country in the
Appendix.20
contributiontothecross-country differencein the gender gapthatwould result if thetwo
countrieshail the same levels of residual male wage inequality and differed only in their
percentile rankings of the female wage residuals. In one country, for instance, the average
woman's wage residual may be at the 35th percentile of the male distribution, while in another
country, itmaybe at only the 25th percentile. This percentile ranking may reflect gender
differences inunmeasuredcharacteristics and/or the impact of labor market discrimination
against women. In the empirical work which follows, we label thistermthe "gap" effect.
Finally, the fourth term of (5) reflects intercountry differences in residual inequality. It
measures the contribution to the intercountry difference that would result if two countries had
the same percentile rankings of the female wage residuals and differed only in the extent of
male residual wage inequality. Suppose, as is likely,that,controlling for measured
characteristics, the female mean log wage is less than the male mean in country j. Then the
larger is the intercountry difference in the overall residual inequality in wages (j-cqJ, the
larger difference there will be in the ultimate. pay gaps in the two countries. That is,
unmeasured deficits in female relative skills or discrimination lower women's position in the
male distribution of wage residuals. The larger the penalty a country places on being below
average in wages, the larger will be its pay gap. In the empirical work below we label this the
effect of "unobserved prices."
Following Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991), we estimate the third term and fourth
terms of (5) empirically using the entire distributions of wage residuals for each country. For
example, to compute (oej-oewui&, we first give each woman in country j a percentile number
based on the ranking of her wage residual (from the country j male wage regression) in
country j's distribution of male wage residuals. We then impute each country j woman's wage
residual given her percentile ranking in country j and the distribution of male wage residuals in
country k. The difference between the mean of these imputed wage residuals for country j and
the actual mean female wage residual for country k is used to find the estimate of (Sj-&Olc)ak21
(note that the mean male residual is alwayszero).The fourth term of(s), &O(cj-cmJ, is
obtained analogously.
According to (5), the full impact of gender-specific factors is reflected in the sum of
the first and third terms, the effect of gender differences in qualifications and of gender
differences in wage rankings at a given level of measured characteristics. Labor market
structure is reflected in the sum of the second and fourth terms, the impact of intercountry
differences in returns to measured and unmeasured characteristics. Within the framework of a
traditional decomposition, the sum of the third and fourth terms represents the impact of
intercountry differences in the "unexplained" differential which is commonly taken as an
estimate of discrimination.
The possibility of discrimination complicates the interpretation of the last term of (5).
With labor market discrimination, this term in part reflects the interaction between countryj's
level of discrimination (defined as pushing women down the distribution of wages) and
intercountry differences in the overall level of inequality which determine how large the
penalty is for that lower position in the distribution (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1991). We
wilt present some indirect evidence that in the case of the countries compared here, this term at
least in part reflects the impact of overall wage-setting. The observed price effect may also
reflect discrimination if, for example, women are "crowded" by exclusion into certain sectors,
lowering relative earnings there even for men (Bergmann, 1974).
We implement this decomposition using the Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991)
accounting method performed on equation (1). Each country's gross gender differential is
expressed in terms of YFULL, hours corrected earnings defined in equation (2). The
explanatory variables in X include the traditional human capital variables of education,
potential experience and its square, as well as union membership, and one-digit industry and
occupation dummy variables.2t The structural variables may reflect both worker skills and
21 ForHungary, Australia and Italy, industry and/or occupation differ from those for the rest
of the countries. In addition, for the latter two, union membership status is not available. For22
rentsreceivedby workers with these characteristics. Unfortunatelythe datasets available to us
lack information on actual labormarketexperience. Thus this remains an important omitted
variable in these analyses, although, to some degree, our controls for education, hours,
industry, and occupation may pick up some of the effects of such omissions.
We have not controlled for marital status in this analysis, although, as noted above, it
may be an important ctor influencing the pay gap. An alternative wouldhave been to
include marital status as a productivity characteristic. However, such an approach is
problematic since this variable appears to measure higher skills for men (Korenman and
Neumark, 1991), but most likely lower skills for women, especially when data on actual labor
market experience are lacking. The approach we have followed allows us to place a sharper
interpretation in the decomposition on the impact of differences in labor market skills.
Recognizing the potential importance of marital status, however, we also perform a
decomposition of pay gaps among married workers. Differences in the results for the whole
labor force and those for married workers can provide interesting insights in cross-country
comparisons. Sample size limitations prevented us from analyzing single workers.
The decomposition for the whole labor force is summarized in Table 7 and that for
married workers (based on equation 1 estimated for married workers only) is presented in
Table 8. Looking first at the results for the whole work force (Table 7), we see that the mean
female percentile, after controlling for measured characteristics,22 ranges from 21.2 in
Germany to about 37 in the United States, Australia, Sweden and Italy. It is noteworthy that
U.S. (and Italian) women place at the top of the list. The column headed "Gap" shows the
contribution of each country's female placement in the male residual wage distribution to its
the purposes of comparing the U.S.andthese countries, we estimated U.S.equationsthat
conformed to the same specification as each country.
22 For eachcountry, this is the mean of the percentile ranking of each woman's residual from
the male regression (ed) in the distribution of male wage residuals (elm).23
relative paygap.The figure is positive for all countries except Australia and Italy,23
indicating that these differences in rankings raise the differential relative to the U.S., often
substantially(the unweighted average effect is.1886). The column headed "Unobserved
Prices"shows that the lowerlevelofresidualwage inequalityin eachoftheothercountries
hasa negativeeffect,often quite considerable, on its gap relative to that in the U.S. (the
unweighted average effect is -.2015).
Table 7 also provides estimates of the impact of measured skills and their prices on
intercountry differences in the pay gap. The "Observed X's" effect is generally positive,
indicating that U.S. women have relatively favorable levels of the measured variables (the
unweighted average effect is .0286). The "Observed Prices" effect is always negative,
indicating that the male returns to the explanatory variables increase the pay gap in the U.S.
relative to other countries (the unweighted average effect is -.0699). However, these observed
effects are much smaller in magnitude than the Unobserved Prices and Gap effects.
The last two columns of the lower panel of Table 7 give the total effect of gender-
specific factors and wage structure. The results suggest that U.S. women fare well with
respect to gender-specific factors (as measured by the sum of the Observed X's and the Gap
effects). For all but Italy, Australia and Sweden, U.S. women have relatively favorable levels
of both productivity characteristics and gender-specific treatment in the labor market. For
these three countries, the gender-specific factors (i.e., the observed X's and the gap effects)
approximately cancel out. In contrast, the U.S. level of inequality (reflected in the sum of
Observed Prices and Unobserved Prices effects) greatly raises its gender pay gap compared to
each of the other countries in the sample. This inequality effect is sufficient or more than
23 Although in both Table 7 and Table 8, themean female percentile is highest in U.S., there
are a few instances in which the gap effect is negative. This reflects 1) our use of the whole
distribution in computing the percentiles and the gap effects which can result in such
inconsistencies and 2) our use of alternative specifications for the U.S. wage regression to
compare the U.S. to countries for which we were not able to include the same industry,
occupation, or union status variables which occasionally resulted in a slightly lower percentile
for the U.S. than for the country in question.24
sufficient to account for the higher pay gap in the U.S. than in the six countries with the
smaller gaps.
The conclusions for married women (Table 8) are similar to those for all workers.
U.S. women again have the highest percentile ranking, yet the pay gap is larger in the U.S.
than in all the other countries except the U.K.U We again find that the U.S. level of
inequality raises its pay gap, while gender specific factors usually lower it. With the exception
of AustraliaandSweden, higher U.S. inequality (i.e., wage structure) is sufficient or more
than sufficient to explain the higher pay gap in the U.S. compared to the countries with
smaller differentials. In the case of Australia and Sweden, U.S. inequality accounts for 72-79
percent of the difference in the married worker pay gap. One interpretation of the moderate
difference between these results and the results for all workers (where inequality accounted for
100percentof the cross-country difference) is that the types of gender-related interventions in
Sweden and Australia (discussed above) have had a disproportionate effect on married
workers. Parental leave (Sweden) and comparable worth (Australia) may have especially large
positive effects on the relative earnings of married women.
An additional point of interest is that, in both Tables 7 and 8, the residual standard
deviation of the wage regressions is considerably higher for U.S. men and women than for
men and women in other countries (the female residual standard deviation is computed from a
female wage regression). Across all the countries in the sample, the correlation coefficient
between the male and female standard deviations is .9344. The fact that the male and female
standard deviations seem to move together in this manner adds to credibility to our framework
in which a country's overall level of inequality is assumed to affect both men and women.25
Other than the U.S., the residual standard deviation is higher for Australia than for the other
24Maritalstatus is not available for Italy.
The standard deviation of gross hours corrected earnings (YFULL) is also higher in the
U.S. than elsewhere (results not shown). Similarly, across all countries, the correlation of the
male and female standard deviations is .9647.25
countries. This occursdespite the Australian traditionof administered wages. This suggests
that actual earnings may deviate from award levels, which are intended to be the minimum
rates.26
The striking finding of Tables 7 and 8 is the importance of wage structure in explaining
international differences in the gender gap. However, as noted earlier, what we have labeled
wage inequality could also reflect the impact of labor market discrimination. What are we
thus to conclude about labor market structure? From a number of indirect indicators we
conclude that it is important, even though it may not be possible to precisely estimate its
effect.
First, our review of wage-setting institutions in each country strongly suggests that the
U.S. system is considerably less centralized than in other countries, thus making a finding of
the importance of wage structure plausible. Second, the U.S. has had a longer and often
stronger commitment to Equal Pay and Equal Employment Opportunity policies than most
other countries in our sample.27 Further, U.S. women compare favorably to women in other
countries in terms of their qualifications and occupational status relative to men. Thus, it is
credible that gender-specific factors do not explain the relatively high pay gap in the U.S.
Third, we found that residual wage variation (and, in results not shown, wage variation) of
both men and women in the U.S. considerably exceeds that of the same gender group in other
countries. Similarly, across all countries, female and male wage (and residual wage) variation
were found to be highly correlated. This, suggests that the same set of factors--measured and
unmeasured prices and wage-setting institutions—affect the wages of both men and women in
each country in a similar way. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even though the
According to Watts and Mitchell (1990), the Australian wage award system allows for
considerable variability in actual earnings. Such variations can be achieved by promotions. In
the 1980s, the dispersion in actual earnings appeared to increase, despite the imposition of
awards with uniform percentage wage increases (Watts and Mitchell, 1990).
27 A primary exception is thecomparable worth approach pursued in Australia which might be
expected to produce a larger immediate impact on wages.26
estimated wage inequality effect may includethe impactof gender discrimination as it interacts
with wage structure, our findings nonetheless suggest an extremely important role for wage
inequality in affecting the gender ratio.
IV. Swimming Upstream: U.S. Women and the Male Wa2e Distribution--1971 to 1988
Figure 1 shows that in the 1980s, the gender pay gap in the U.S. narrowed
considerably, following a long period of relative stability. In addition, as noted above, labor
market inequality has been increasing in the u.s. in recent years. The analysis reported above
indicated that the high level of U.S. wage inequality has raised its gender pay gap compared to
that in other countries. This finding, in conjunction with these time-series features of the U.S.
labor market, implies that U.S. women have been swimming against a current of rising
inequality. The falling gender gap in the U.S. becomes even more impressive in light of these
recent trends.
To provide some evidence on the degree to which growing inequality has retarded the
progress of women's relative pay in the U.S., we have included some analyses of wages from
the 1971-88 period. Specifically, we have examined the log of real weeldy wages for full-time
workers using data from the 1972, 1982 and 1989 Current Population Surveys. This
information refers to earnings in 1971, 1981, and 1988, respectively. Earnings are expressed
in 1981 dollars using the consumer price index.
Trends in the pay gap and in the wage distribution for these years are described in the
upper panel of Table 9. During this time, women moved steadily up the distribution of male
wages, from an average percentile of 19.53 in 1971 to a 30.41 figure for 1988; the pace of
this upward movement increased in the 1980s. The gender pay differential also fell during
both the 1971-1981 and 1981-1988 periods, with some acceleration after 1981. (Figure 1
28Thislatter figure is roughly similar to our results for gross hours corrected earnings from
the ISS? (33.2) given in Figure 3, providing further confirmation of the ISSP's
representativeness.27
shows similar trends.) The declining gendergap reflecteda combinationoffalling male and
rising female real wages over the 1971-88 period.
Table 9 also indicates that the standard deviations of the log of female and the log of
male real earnings both rose in the 1980s; from 1971 to 1981, however, only male variability
increased. Katz and Murphy (1992) found similar male and female patterns for changes in
overall wage inequality. Such results could imply that the wage structure widened for both
men and women in the 1980s but only for men in the l970s, calling into question (at least for
the 1970s) our approach based on male inequality. However, changes in the variation in log
wages are not the same as changes in the wage structure, since the former can be affected by
changes in the distribution of productive characteristics as well as in skill prices. Katz and
Murphy (1992) in fact found that residual wage inequality rose steadily and at similar rates for
both men and women in both the 1970s and 1980s. These findings do suggest that similar
processes were at work for both men and women in the U.S. during this period.29
The lower panel of Table 9 provides a decomposition of changes in the paygap into
portions due to women's movement up the male distribution and due to changes in male
inequality. The stories for the two subperiods are similar: if the overall degree of inequality
had not risen, the pay gap would have closed faster than it in fact did. Taking the 1971-88
period as a whole, if male inequality had stayed at its 1971 level but women's relative
qualifications and/or treatment had improved at their actual rates, then the pay gap would have
fallen by .2301 log points. Since the actual fall in the pay gap was .1735 log points, our
figures imply that growing inequality in the 1970s and l9SOs reduced the convergence in the
pay gap by .0566logpoints (or about one fourth--24.6 percent--of the potential decline in the
pay gap). The retarding effect of increasing inequality on female gains is also illustrated in
Figure 4 where we see that, had male wage inequality remained at its 1971 level, the gender
29 Since Juhn,Murphy and Pierce (forthcoming) found in their study of male wage inequality
that residual inequality grew within as well as between cohorts, they interpret the increase as
being due to a rise in skill prices rather than to an increase in the variance of unobserved
productivity characteristics.28
ratio would have increased from 58.0 in 1971 to 73.1 percent in 1988, 4 percentage points
higher than the actual 1988 ratio of 69.0 percent.
The results for the U.S. trends imply a moderate but noticeable effect of rising
inequality in slowing the convergence in women's relative pay. It is noteworthy that the
inequality effect is smaller in Table 9 than it is in Tables 7 and 8. That is, the higher U.S.
level of inequality compared to other countries has a larger effect on intercountry differences
in the gender pay gap than changes in U.S. inequality over time have had on U.S. trends in the
pay gap. While there have been major recent changes in the U.S. wage structure, cross-
sectional differences between the U.S. and other countries are even more dramatic.
V. Conclusions -
Inthis paper, we have used micro-data to examine the gender pay gap in ten
industrialized countries. Published data indicate that the gender gap is higher in the U.S. than
in most industrialized countries; and it is higher than six of the countries in our sample. The
striking finding of the paper is the importance of wage structure in explaining the higher U.S.
gender gap. The greater level of wage inequality in the U.S. than elsewhere works to increase
the gender differential in the U.S. relative to all the other countries in our sample. Our results
suggest that the U.S. gap would be similar to that in countries like Sweden, Italy and Australia
(the countries with the smallest gaps) if the U.S. had their level of wage inequality. This
suggests that we need to focus both on the supply and demand for skills (i.e., some of the
determinants of skill prices) and on wage-setting institutions to explain this important cause of
international differences in the gender pay gap. In a brief review of the institutional setting in
each of these countries we concluded that the wage-determination process in the U.S. is more
decentralized than elsewhere, quite likely contributing to its higher level of wage inequality.
Much attention has been focused on women's growing relative levels of skills and labor
force commitment as causes of changes in the pay gap. Our research suggests that to
understand changes in the gender pay gap fully, it would also be fruitful to examine the impact
of changes in wage structure. As a preliminary step in that direction, we examined male and29
female wends in real weekly wages for the 1971-1988 period in the U.S. to determine the
degree to which growing U.S. inequality has retarded the growth of women's relative wages.
In the face of rising inequality, women's relative skills and treatment have to improve merely
for the pay gap to remain constant; still larger gains are necessary for it to be reduced. We
found thatwomenwere able to counter the effects of rising inequality on their relative earnings
through a steady increase in their percentile ranking in the male wage distribution, from 19.53
in 1971 to 30.41 in 1988. The pace of this upward movement quickened in the 1980s as did
the increase in women's relative wages. Our results indicate that increasing inequality reduced
women's potential gains in relative pay by about one quarter during the 197 1-88 period.References
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Figure 4: Simulated Female-Male Pay
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Major decisions by Conciliation Conciliation and Arbitration
and Arbitration Commission Commission
Sex Discrimination Act Sex Discrimination Commissioner
PublicService ActAmendments Public Service Commission
Affirmative Action Act Human RightsandEqual
Opportunities Commission;
Affirmative Action Agency
Austria Equal Pay 1979
Equal Employment 1985
Opportunity
Law on Equal Treatment in Equality Commission
Employment 1.
(amended) J Ministryof Labour




Code of Civil Procedure (612) Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs; Labour Courts
Basic Law Ministry of Labour and Social
Code of Civil Procedure Affairs; Labour Courts
Cli61Ia, 61 lb. 612a)
Directive on professional Ministry of Youth, Family,
promotion of women in Federal Women and Health
Administration





Equal Pay Agreement of the Collectivebargaining parties
industrial sector
Equal Pay Law for the agricultural Ministry of Labor
sector
Act on Equal Employment
Opportunities betweenthe Sexes










Equal Employment _ 1978
Opportunity J
Act on Equal Status between the Equal Status Council; Equal
Sexes Status Ombudsman; Equal Status
Appeals Board
Basic Agreement between Collective bargaining parties
Employers' and Trade Unions
Confederation
Sweden Equal Pay
Equal Employment .- 1980
Opportunity J 1983-1984
Act on Equality between Men and Equal Opportunity Ombudsman
Women at Work
Major Equal Opportunity Collective bargaining parties
Agreements between Employers
and Trade Unions' Confederation
in Private and Public Sector






(in force) Industrial Tribunals
(amended)
Sex Discrimination Act Equal Opportunities Commission
(amended) (EOC); Industrial Tribunals
United States Equal Pay 1963
1968
Equal Pay Act Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)
:::1unities } Equal Em4oyment Opportunity
ExecutiveOrder11375 Office of Federal Contract
Compliance_Programs
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Employment Outlook (September 1988), Table 5.11, pp. 167-s.
NB(RTk83.OQCfwfwTable 2
Maternity and Parental Leave
Country Maximum Length Paid/Unpaid
Maternity Leave
Australia 52 weeks Unpaid'
Austria 16 weeks 100%
Germany, FederalRepublic 14 weeks 100%
Hungary 24 weeks 100%
Italy 5 months 80%
Norway 20 weeks 100%
Sweden 12 weeks 90%
Switzerland 8-12 weeks Paid as sicknessb
United Kingdom 40 weeks Up to 90%C
UnitedStates d
Parental Leave
Australia Up to 66 weekse Mostly unpaid
Austria Age 1 year Unpaid (allowance possible)
Germany, FederalRepublic Age 1 year Paid (fixedallowance)
Hungary Age 18months Paid (child-care benefits)
Italy 6 months Paid (reduced benefits)
Norway 70 days Paid (social security)
Sweden 360 days Paidt (social security)
United States
•Provisions for Commonwealth Government employees include 12 weeks' paid leave under certain
conditions.
bCompensationdepends on the level of insurance.
18weekspaid at different rates,
dSomestates provide unpaid maternity leave. Federal law prohibits employment discrimination
based on pregnancy and childbirth.
Applies to some public sector employees only. Parental leave may encompass maternity leave,
adoption leave, etc.
90% for the first 270 days, then reduced fixed rate.
tInsome states only. Up to 12 weeks, unpaid.
Source: International Labour Organization, Conditions of Work Digest, 7, no. 2 (February, 1988),
Tables2and3,•pp. 20-I.
NBaTAB2.DCCTable 3














Australia 0,7334 0.7386 0.6756 0.9044
Austria 0.7407 0.7489 0.6607 0.9170
Germany 0.7091 0.7248 0.6006 0.9806
Hungary 0.6454 0.6631 0.6087 0.7728
Italy 0.8232 ———— ———— —
Norway 0.7138 0.7411 0.6756 0.8958
Sweden 0.7724 0.7865 0.7209 0.9435
Switzerland 0.6455 0.6872 0.6140 0.8709
United Kingdom 0.6133 0.6447 0.5604 0.8251
United States 0.6692 0.6692 0.5672 0.8758
aYFULL, earnings evaluated at full—time (40) hours (see equation
(2)). The number of hours is not available for Hungary, but all
workers are full time. Marital status is not available for Italy.









Australia 0.8933 0.8688 0.8856 0.5624 0.6774 0.59S6
Austria 0.7701 0.7956 0.7784 0.3883 0.5605 0.4444
Germany 0.8408 0.7047 0.7884 0.3742 0.5759 0.4477
Hungary 0.8552 0.8041 0.8423 0.6638 0.6320 0.6562
Italy (1980)
——— ——— 0.7880 ——— ——— 0.4390
Norway 0.9067 0.7790 0.8778 0.5896 0.5960 0.5910
Sweden (1988)
——— —— 0.9000 ——— ——— 0.8500
Switzerland 0.9679 0.8477 0.9312 0.3949 0.8181 0.6045
United Kingdom 0.9211 0.8202 0.8930 0.5572 0.6686 0.5886
United States 0.9068 0.8564 0.8873 0.6200 0.7076 0.6614
Note; Sourcefor Swedenis Lofetrom and Gustafason (1991). Source for Italy
is OECD, Labor Force Statistics (1990), p. 299.
NBTAB2DOC.EURLFP. PRJ4Table S
Hearts for Narriad Spouse Present (MAflP)























United States 0.63660.5059 0.11450.18000.07710.24370.19150.2947
Note: PART is defined as employed for less than 35 hours per week. This variable is
not available for Hungary. Marital status is not available for Italy.
BERTAZ2.DOC. MARFAPT.PRNTable 6










United Kingdom 0.4395 0.3488
United states 0.3568 0.3430







Percentilet) Strd. dev. Strd. dev.
Australia 0.3100 —0.2386 36.8 0.5998 0.6811—0.0956
Austria 0.3002 —0.2739 30.4 0.3967 0.4450 0.1014
Germany 0.3437 —0.2939 30.5 0.3774 0.4903—0.0579
Hungary 0.4379 —0.4115 21.2 0.3905 0.3667 0.0252
Italy 0.1946 —0.1653 37.3 0.3811 0.4375—0.1737
Norway 0.3371 —0.3070 29.5 0.4101 0.5120—0.0645
Sweden 0.2582 —0.1985 36.2 0.4231 0.4551—0.1434
Switzerland 0.4377 —0.2233 35.1 0.4048 0.5260 0.0361
United Kingdom 0.4889 —0.3904 24.1 0.4084 0.4379 0.0873
United States0.4016 —0.2777 37.3 0.6717 0.7725







Australia 0.0595—0.0737 —0.0410—0.0404 0.0185 —0.1141
Austria 0.0679—0.1655 0.2283 —0.2321 0.2962 —0.3976
Germany 0.0351—0.1091 0.2538—0.2376 0.2889 —0.3467
Hungary —0.0257 —0.0351 0.5827—0.4967 0.5570 —0.5318
Italy 0.0111—0.0434—0.0133—0.1282 —0.0022 —0.1716
Norway 0.0062 —0.0999 0.2445—0.2152 0.2507 —0.3151
Sweden —0.0236—0.0406 0.0203—0.0995 —0.0033 —0.1401
Switzerland 0.1008—0.0102 0.0020—0.0564 0.1028 —0.0666
United Kingdom0.0261—0.0514 0.4200—0.3073 0.4461 —0.3587
aThS gender difference in YFULL, earnings evaluated at full—time (40) hours (see
equation (2)).
b
The mean female residual percentile in the male distribution of wage
residuals.
c The sun of the observedX's and gap effects.
d Thesum of the observed and unobserved prices effects.
Notes: Regressions include control, for education, potential experience and its
square, union status, and occupation and industry dummy variables. The U.S.
value used to calculate "DiDUSA for Hungary, Australia and Italy is based on
hours corrections from U.S. regressions which conform to the specifications for
each of those countries. However, the u.s. value in the D column is based on
the more detailed specification permitted by the ISSP and CSCC data files.
NDERTAB2.DOC.DECOMfl2.ncT.bl. 8













Australia 0.4091 —0.3629 28.7 0.5480 0.6887 —0.1621
Austria 0.4255 —0.3966 23.9 0.4041 0.4751 —0.1427
Germany 0.5068 —0.4817 18.8 0.3280 0.5225 —0.0614
Hungary 0.4964 —0.4462 16.8 0.3811 0.3703—0.0700
Norway 0.3881 —0.3435 25.6 0.3735 0.5033—0.1801
Sweden 0.2839 —0.2536 30.2 0.3537 0.4152—0.2843
United Kingdom 0.5789 —0.4587 21.0 0.3931 0.4510 0.0107
United States 0.5682 —0.4650 30.4 0.6062 0.8450









Australia 0.0513 —0.0578—0.0958—0.0598 —0.0445 —0.1176
Austria 0.0509 —0.1251 0.2142—0.2826 0.2651 —0.4077
Germany 0.0145 —0.0924 0.4740—0.4573 0.4885 —0.5497
Hungary —0.0281 —0.0168 0.4997—0.5248 0.4716 —0.5416
Norway —0.0102 —0.0483 0.1129—0.2344 0.1027 —0.2827
Sweden —0.0307 —0.0422—0.0279—0.1835 —0.0586 —0.2257
United Kingdom0.0040 0.0130 0.3170—0.3233 0.3210 —0.3103
arhe gender difference in YFULL,earningsevaluated at full—time (40) hours (see
equation (2)).
bThe mean female residual percentile in the male distribution ofwage residuals.
CThe sum of the observed X's and gap effects.
sum of the observed and unobserved prices effects.
Notes: Regressions include controls for education, potential experience and its
square, union status, and occupation and industry dummy variables. The U.S.
value used to calculate 'DLDUSA for Hungary, Australia and Italy is based on
hours corrections from U.S. regressions which conform to the specifications for
each of those countries. However, the U.S. value in the D" column is based on
the more detailed specification permitted by the ISSP and CSCC data files.
NBERTAD2. .DECOMP92ASCTable 9
Analysis of tog Real Weekly Wages for Full—Time Workers,
United States, 1971—1988 (1981 dollars)
1971 1981 1988
Mean Female Percentile in




















1971—1981 —0.0731 —0.1143 0.0412
1981—1988 —0.1004 —0.1251 0.0247
1971—1988 —0.1735 —0.2301 0.0566
?ThAB2. DOC, LTSTIMEASCAppendix
Variable Definitions. Means and Earnin2s Regression Results by Country
Definitions of the explanatory variables are given in Table A-i. The earnings
definitions for each country are listed below:
Austria: Net Monthly Income from Employment
Germany andSwitzerland:Net Income per Month after taxes and social insurance
Italy: Annual labor income
Britain: Total annual earnings before taxes
USA: Previous year's earnings from occupation before taxes
Hungary: Monthly earnings
Sweden: Income (from all sources) in previous year
Norway: Annual income from all jobs.
Australia: Annual earnings from all jobs.
WBTAB2.DOCTable A-i
Definitionsof Explanatory Variables
EDUC =yearsof schooling completed
PEXP =age-EDUC-6
PEXPSQ =EXPsquared
UNION =dummyvariable for union membership
Occupation dummy variables:















TRANS =transportation,communications and utilities
WTRADE =wholesaletrade
RTRADE =retailtrade
FIRE =finance,insurance and real estate
SERVS =services
GOVT =government(the omitted category).





TRADE =wholesaleand retail trade
SERVS =services,finance insurance and real estate
GOVT (see above), the omitted category
Occupation dummy variables for Australia:
MGR =managersand farm managers
CLER, CRAFT, and OPER (see above)
LAB =laborersand farm laborers
SALESW =salesand service workers
PROF (see above), the omitted category
Industry dummy variables for Australia:
AG, TRANS, MINCON (see above)
MANUF =manufacturing
TRADE =wholesaleand retail trade
FISERV =finance,insurance, real estate and services
GOVT (see above), the omitted category
NBERTAB2.DOCTable A-i, cont'd
Definitions of Explanatory Variables
Occupation dummyvariablesfor Italy:
BLUE =bluecollar
WHITELOW =lowerlevel white collar
WHITEHI =higherlevel white collar, the omitted category



































PART 0.017 0.346 0.037 0.449 0.1150.244 0.022 0.282 0.023 0.252 0.053 0.456 0.070 0.525





UNiON 0.3490.180 0.471 0.396 0.205 0.125 0.542 0.349 0.433 0.2650.786 0.7960.599 0.595
NOR 0.104 0.069 0.1570.066 0.187 0.141 0.145 0.062 0.180 0.095 0.055 0.018 0.102 0,039
CLER 0.092 0.2720.072 0.327 0.055 0.259 0.1340.298 0.116 0.293 0.063 0.198 0.088 0.237
SALES 0.049 0.1190.0460.0770.061 0.054 0.0420.075 0.054 0.061 0.061 0.093 0.070 0.095
CRAFT 0.351 0.0590.292 0.081 0.2060.0280.308 0.073 0.183 0.0140.197 0.0210.2200.017
OPER 0.095 0.015 0.119 0.032 0.124 0.071 0.101 0.037 0.090 0.027 0.269 0.087 0.190 0.060
LAO 0.013 0.019 0.0510.008 0.0590.0090.047 0.028 0.021 0.020 0.0500.0060.017 0.012
SERVW#Z 0.057 0.134 0.060 0.191 0.081 0.2080.061 0.183 0.052 0.0750.0Th0.3210.052 0.191
FARM4GR 0.024 0.011 0.005 0.001 0.0190.003 0.0420.046 0.018 0.0140.0200.0000.038 0,008
FARMLAS 0.0090.0070.005 0.003 0.0090.002 0.014 0.014 0.003 0.0070.009 0.0060.0100,008
AG 0.031 0.021 0.0150.0070.041 0.0130.0560.050 0.031 0.0200.046 0.0060.056 0.019
MICON 0.121 0.0180.1180.011 0.1190.0130.1280.034 0.103 0.0140.127 0.0210.118 0.014
MAN0UR 0.244 0.094 0.195 0.072 0.151 0.0640.2350.096 0.188 0.0880.225 0.0690.207 0.081
MAJINON 0.1110.0980.1290,1070.092 0.0660.1030.147 0.152 0.1290.094 0.0840.0340.056
TRAIlS 0.056 0.0110.1040.032 0.086 0.035 0.0760.014 0.070 0.034 0.138 0.0510.125 0.021
WIRA0E 0.0230.0300.044 0.0290.046 0.0180.0300.041 0.003 0.020 0.037 0.0120.0470.031
RTRAOE 0.0430.1530.073 0.181 0.115 0.174 0.0580.103 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.1020.053 0.104
FiRE 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.054 0.052 0.083 0.042 0.050 0.088 0.054 0.015 0.0180.0470.044
SERVS 0.0890.2480.202 0.4390.218 0.471 0.112 0.311 0.111 0.122 0.230 0.5650.2990.606












PART 0.0460.374 ----• 0.057 0.261
MPART 0.929 7.031 --- --- 1.315 5.733
I4FULL 42.37025.865 --- --- 39.16329.515
EDYRS 11.01011.189 11.40611.026 9.82011.017
PEXP 19.38517.161 19.76519.971 23.91719.664
PEXPSQ 519,751431.540 524.690530.290 732.306532.517
UNION ------ 0.6360.762 •--'--
NCR 0.114 0.030 0.0590.051 ......
CLER 0.093 0.345 0.0720.24?"....
SALESW 0.0Th0.190 0.0120.039 ...
CRAFT 0.241 0.038 0.2520.050."
OPER 0.116 0.033 0.2700.076 ..
LAO 0.1570.149 0.1100.179......
BLUE ......•... 0.514 0.384
WNITELCM ... ... 0.433 0.606
SERVUK""- 0.041 0.107"."
FARI*IGR"' 0.012 0.003-
FARMLAB... 0.058 0.032 ......
AG 0.034 0.013 0.233 0,132 0.034 0.035
MIcON 0.104 0.018 -—
NANUF 0.215 0.113 ""-"
TRANS 0.146 0.046 0.111 0.056 0.116 0.162
TRADE 0.163 0.194 0.042 0,116 0.112 0.035
FISERV 0.257 0.556 ..-... ... .--
IWO ... -.- ... 0.392 0.186
FIRE .----' ..." 0.040 0.039
GOVT ...." ."" 0.144 0.131




Coefficient. f rotR.gre.sionAnalysis of YFULL











PART -0.52610.2609 -1.17410.17Th -1.39790.2071 -1.8227 0.1557
HPART 0.0256 0.00940.03580.0053 0.04910.00780.05790.0029
HFULL 0.0107 0.0013 0.00270.0029 0.00450.00120.00420.0035
EDYRS 0.0478 0.00420.05350.0089 0.07000.00960.09280.0112
PUP 0.0686 0.00320.04800.0058 0.0529 0.00330.01450.0040
PEXPSQ -0.00110.0001 -0.00090.0001 -0.0010 0.0001 -0.00020.0001
UNION 0.0250 0.0213 0.1033 0.0451 0.05150.02360.0707 0.0290
NOR 0.05550.0382 0.11250.0744 0.11010.0397 -0.08750.0623
CLER -0.17750.0445 -0.03630.0509 -0.3158 0.0505 -0.2251 0.0430
SALES 0.0277 0.0523 -0.1492 0.0721-0.0606 0.0597 -0.35410.0665
CRAFT -0.18600.0323 -0.20510.0895 -0.22530.0373 -0.41720.0680
OPEN -0.24170.0421 -0.06120.1521 -0.3488 0.0456 -0.51560.0893
LAB -0.54620.0908 -0.2836 0.1307 -0.44310.0577 -0.22270.1524
SERVYK -0.10200.0481-0.24970.0620 -0.2678 0.0535 -0.44890.0467
FARSIOR-0.1357 0.1695 -0.77940.2792 -0.0177 0.1726 -0.81780.4971
FARHLAS-0.25720.1547 -0.23420.2505 -0.35120.1880 -0.6753 0.2757
AG -0.29110.1600 -0.06740.2176 -0.28600.1256 -0.1540 0.2187
HICON -0.00500.03840.02140.1311 0.02080.05460.1342 0.1323
HANDUR 0.05240.0311 -0.02240.0709 -0.05940.04980.09710.0736
MANNON 0.03530.0374 -0.18340.0736 0.00770.05250.02810.0701
TRANS 0.06760.04740.17020.1618 -0.01380.05480.11420.0860
WTRADE -0.06080.0672-0.09030.1042 -0.04110.06890.18110.0914
RTRADE -0.09940.0536 -0.13380.0662 -0.33270.0598 -0.13620.0646
FIRE 0.10610.05470.0097 0.0874 0.1424 0.06430.04630.0738
SERVS -0.03000.0393 .0.08080.0511 -0.1782 0.0463 -0.06740.0560
S.E.E. .3774 .4903 .4084 .4379
R2 .4582 .3526 .4016 .6521
Salrp(esize 1592 874 1477 1204
NBERTAflDOC. C0E92.A3CTable A—3 (cont'd)
Coefficients from Regression Analysis of YFULL









INTERCEP8.23750.17708.14920.2507 8.81910.1507 8.5387 0.2357
PART -0.74130.1763 -1.63440.1843 -1.40620.4051 -1.38130.2189
WART 0.0238 0.00620.04210.0056 0.05490.01620.03750.0067
HFULL 0.00850.00180.0050 0.0029 0.00540.0018 -0.00290.0034
EDYRS 0.06950.00800.08100.01 17 0.0187 0.00800.04840.0124
PEXP 0.05340.00550.03330.0066 0.03420.00530.03010.0066
PEXPSQ -0.00080.0001 -0.00040.0001 -0.00050.0001 -0.00050.0001
LIIION 0.22220.04690.13440.0704 0.07890.03540.07610.0492
NCR 0.0757 0.06420.09270.0838 -009080.0755 -0.10680.1151
CIER -0.3257 0.0908 -0.11610.0748 -0.24990.0747 -0.09540.0754
SALES -0.06600.0917 -0.5432 0.1189-0.2707 0.1085 -0.17290.1159
CRAFT -0.17380.0681 -0.12900.15Th -0.2919 0.0668 -0.3829 0.1136
OPER -0.32920.0780 -0.21620.1259 -0.32660.0800 -0.27410.1462
LAB -0.5927 0.0952 -0.51620.2501 -0.38420.0959 -0.30990.1505
SERWK -0.36200.0838-0.45650.0804 -0.28490.0839 -0.30550.0791
FARjq4GR -0.42610.2119 0.4187 0.4612 -0.70960.1633 -0.66640.2803
FARKLAB-0.58740.2447 -0.90510.5658 -0.4406 0.1587 -0.42340.2150
AG 0.11020.1743 -0.52730.2605 -0.0389 0.1388 -0.0132 0.2601
NICOW -0.18440.0884 -0.30260.2211 0.04930.0649 -0.11020.1338
KAWDUR 0.0177 0.08280.06550.13Th -0.02750.05880.07640.0972
NANNON -0.05500.0898 -0.24540.1371 0.0299 0.0667 -0.02950.0975
TRANS 0.04030.09140.13400.1507 -0.01710.07340.0940 0.1939
WIRADE -0.29410.1103 -0.29870.1933 0.20730.10690.1628 0.1249
RTRADE -0.30250.0864 -0.37960.1089 -0.1369 0.08940.00980.1026
FIRE 0.03990.1056 -0.0377 0.1214 0.22230.09370.12950.1151
SERVS -0.28010.0759 -0.24860.0973 -0.00780.06830.03300.0705
S.E.E. .6717 .7725 .3967 .4450
R2 .3808 .4206 .2883 .3754
SançLe size 1406 1194 642 436
NBERTAB2.DOC,C0EP92.A.5CTab]., A—3 (contd)
coefficients fro. Regression Analysis of YFULL
YFULL Coefficients for SwitzerLand flULL CoefficientsforSweden
Men Woen Men Ucinen
Std Std Std std
VariableCoeffErrorCoeffError CoeffErrorCoeffError
INTERCEP6.2999 0.19176.26890.5978 9.41220.23599.69280.5082
PART 0.0939 0.5455 -2.13730.6649 -0.70210.3539 -1.15910.4648
HPART -0.00080.02030.06650.0164 0.01980.01290.03010.0061
HFULL 0.00820.0028 0.00210.0117 0.00470.0028 0.00110.0106
EDYRS 0.05480.00670.07360.0172 0.04340.00980.04260.0116
PEXP 0.07190.00760.05430.0155 0.06740.00630.0297 0.0082
PEXPSQ -0.00100.0001 -0.00080.0003 -0.00100.0001 -0.00040.0002
UMION 0.02920.04400.13270.1135 0.1856 0.05Th0.28280.0701
NOR 0iTh5 o.0673-0.09850.1800 0.1813 0.10600.22280.2065
cia -0.04480.0831 -0.00220.1503 -0.05890.09800.08200.0959
SALES -0.1381 0.1082 -0.31010.2676 0.05910.1356 -0.01160.1649
cRAFT -0.2318 0.0739 -0.12210.4239 -0.01510.0786 -0.11280.2179
OPER -0.16310.0921 -0.10920.3465 -0.18320.07500.19380.1467
LAB -0.20810.1578 -0.16270.3438 -0.11490.12720.05970.3691
SERVWI( -0.29550.1146 -0.38210.2029 -0.2598 0.0980 -0.06100.0887
FARPV4GR-1.0129 0.2748 -0.25770.7095 -0.5679 0.23910.00000.0000
FARMLAB 0.01500.45850.14390.5670 -0.17250.2900 -0.58750.3538
AG -3.00960.2132 -0.22080.5417 0.26240.18420.0000 00000
MICON 0.07200.08230.29630.4067 0.17770.11820.3277 0.2192
MANDUR 0.10550.07060.10370.1809 0.17460.1123 -0.0218 0.1572
MAWNON 0.0478 0.0736 -0.01110.1906 0.11670.1225 -0.1237 0.1481
TRANS -0.0181 0.0986 0.42990.2779 0.15080.11470.02800.1517
UTRADE -0.27450.4206 0.32030.3443 0.18690.15300.02070.2764
RTRADE 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.03220.1748 -0.03530.1762
FIRE 0.27210.08740.24630.2221 0.52010.19310.2367 0.2120
SERVS 0.06250.08010.36020.1649 0.1146 0.1065 -0.01710.1109
S.E.E. 4049 .5236 .4231 .4551
R2 .5341 .6294 .6240 .4251
Sairple sIze 388 147 457 333
P4bFAB2.DOC, COEF92.ASCTable A—3 (cont'd)
Coefficients I roa Regression Analysis of nULL




VariabteCoeff Error Coeff Error VariableCoeff Error Coeff
Std
Error
INTERCEP 10.24700.184411.12020.3962 INTERCEP8.93940.09588.8661 0.1631
PART -1.51050.1818 -2.09450.3370 PART -1.56240.1153 -1.65340.1397
HPART 0.05360.00660.05290.0044 IIPART 0.0383 0.00420.0472 0.0024
HFULL 0.00520.0016 -0.00950.0078 HFIJLL 0.0019 0.00140.0028 0.0031
EDYRS 0.04530.0070 0.03850.0119 EDYRS 0.04520.00460.04100.0058
PUP 0.05310.0048 0.00990.0072 PEXP 0.05790.0028 0.02950.0038
PEXPSQ -0.00080.0001 -0.00010.0001 PEXPSO -0.00100.0001 -0.00040.0001
UNION 0.06480.03310.20910.0499 NCR -0.01490.0362 -0.19920.0805
NCR 0.04650.0592 -0.00280.1238 CLER -0.13890.0380 -0.15060.0410
CLER -0.00510.0620 -0.05820.0723 SALESIJ-01999 0.0416 -0.2987 0.0478
SALES 0.00730.07840.02320.1311 CRAFT -0.22050.0328 -0.34680.0742
CRAFT -0.0630 0.0552 -0.16120.1977 OPER -0.14850.0394 -0.36620.0862
OPER -0.14190.0607 -0.23540.1329 LAB -0.26290.0364 -0.47350.0518
LAB -0.1307 0.13810.07660.2741 AG -0.81510.0595 -0.57340.1231
SERWK 0.00940.0752 -0.27860.0764 MICON -0.06030.0429 0.1726 0.1056
FARMGR-0.51400.17252.10190.5204 NANUF -0.08310.03760.0488 0.0661
FARHLAB-0.70380.2001 1.02460.5229 TRANS -0.0072 0.03930.07390.0775
AG 0.39710.1934 -1.57740.4789 TRADE -0.21510.0400 -0.07340.0610








S.E.E. .4101 .5120 S.E.E. .5998 .6811
R2 .4139 .5101 R2 .3135 .4318
Saapte size 832 518 Sanptesize 4556 3003
NBERTAB2.DOC, COEF92.ASCTable A—3 (cont'd)
Coefficients from Regression Analysis of YFULL









VariableCoeff Error Coeff Error VariableCoeff Error Coeff Error
INTERCEP8.17700.08307.7577 0.0807 INTERCEP8.73030.07838.71730.1579
EDYRS 0.03750.0036 00463 0.0039 PART -0.48250.1064 -0.85660.1268
PEXP 0.03290.00300.0319 0.0028 HPART 0.02050.00390.02070.0030
PEXPSO -0.00060.0001 -0.00050.0001 HFULL 0.00820.00120.00050.0027
UNION 0.01150.02120.1027 0.0225 ED 0.03950.00220.05250.0034
P4GR 0.05520.0475 -0.12810.0466 EXP 0.0457 0.00190.03770.0027
CLER -0.15460.0451 -0.18510.0293 EXPSO -0.0007 0.0000 -0.00050.0001
SALES -0.30070.0961 -0.37340.0578 BLUE -0.5476 0.0330 -0.41420.0950
CRAFT -0.05500.0358 -0.21640.0419 WIIITELOW -0.37830.0294 -0.24200.0910
OPER -0.07170.0374 -0.13050.0420 AG -0.13920.0363 -0.66660.0523
LAB -0.10760.0453 -0.2507 0.0357 IWO 0.0579 0.01960.01020.0282
SER -0.09770.0558 -0.18620.0378 TRADE 0.0578 0.02450.02990.0281
FARMMGR-0.05640.0904 -0.88690.1567 TRANS 0.10810.02430.04200.0504
FARHIAB-0.14420.0545 -0.34350.0630 FIRE 0.2218 0.03380.15460.0481






S.EE. .3905 .3668 S.E.E .3811 .4375
R2 .2059 .2819 R2 .3995 .3741
Sanplesize 1876 1835 Sairple size 4152 2480
NBmAB2.DOC,C0EE92.ASC